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Humans are experts in face perception. We are better able to distinguish between the
differences of faces and their components than between any other kind of objects. Several
studies investigating the underlying neural networks provided evidence for deviated face
processing in criminal individuals, although results are often confounded by accompanying
mental or addiction disorders. On the other hand, face processing in non-criminal healthy
persons can be of high juridical interest in cases of witnessing a felony and afterward iden-
tifying a culprit. Memory and therefore recognition of a person can be affected by many
parameters and thus become distorted. But also face processing itself is modulated by dif-
ferent factors like facial characteristics, degree of familiarity, and emotional relation.These
factors make the comparison of different cases, as well as the transfer of laboratory results
to real live settings very challenging. Several neuroimaging studies have been published
in recent years and some progress was made connecting certain brain activation patterns
with the correct recognition of an individual. However, there is still a long way to go before
brain imaging can make a reliable contribution to court procedures.
Keywords: eyewitness memory, eyewitness testimony, face processing, offender’s memory, identification, fMRI,
real-life events, brain imaging
INTRODUCTION
Our face is a very salient part of our body and maybe the most
memorable feature (Henke et al., 1994). We are able to remember
a great amount of individual faces. Our sensitivity for the small
differences between facial characteristics is higher than for any
other object category (O’Toole, 2005). This is one of the reasons
why face recognition does play such a fundamental role for identi-
fication of a culprit. This applies a fortiori, as faces are less alterable
than clothes or even hair styles.
Since eyewitnesses yield crucial and sometimes even the only
available evidence in court, their testimonies are of critical impor-
tance for the juridical system. Unfortunately, eyewitnesses’ mem-
ories are not immune to decay and distortions. In an investigation
of several cases in which convicts had been exonerated by DNA
evidence afterward, the National Institute of Justice asserted that
mainly eyewitness testimonies had been the most compelling evi-
dence (Connors et al., 1996). Although in some cases eyewitnesses
might have deceitful intentions and even give false confessions
(e.g., to protect themselves or others), false information is often
provided inadvertently for reasons of memory distortion. Our
memories can vanish partly or completely, can be deformed in
many ways or entirely originate from illusion (Markowitsch and
Staniloiu, 2012). But not only eyewitnesses’ memories are prone
to distortion. Offenders’ memories can be modified by different
factors, as well. Although in most cases face identification made
by the offender is of less importance, it can become relevant given
that eyewitnesses might misidentify a person as a culprit or in
some cases might have deceitful intentions. For those reasons,
memories of an offender are fundamental for his or hers defense.
Furthermore, some evidence concerning deviated face processing
in offenders could be obtained in recent years, concluding that
faces are processed differently even during non-criminal events,
as well as facial expressions (Pardini and Phillips, 2010). A bet-
ter comprehension of altered brain activity in culprits might give
an expedient contribution to the understanding of delinquent
behavior.
For literature search and selection, we started with standard
databases like PubMed, PsycInfo, and Web of Science and used a
large quantity of different key words in order to receive the rel-
evant literature for this article. The most fruitful ones have been
amongst others: eyewitness, face processing, face recognition, func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), identification, offender,
and different combinations of these. Secondly, we also used the
“related article” and “cited by” search. We decided not to restrict
ourselves too strongly by this common approach and included
some articles which were obtained differently but contributed
significantly to our topic as well as a few book chapters. Selec-
tion criteria were currentness of data, meeting the methodological
demands, and topic relatedness. For other domains like memory
influencing factors in the introduction, we conducted a separate
literature search using other keywords, mainly memory in com-
bination with different terms like alcohol, age, amnesia, attention,
context dependent, emotion, false memory, intoxication, stress, and
trustworthiness.
By reviewing the eminent literature we will (a) give an intro-
duction to the general factors that can affect memory storage
and retrieval in eyewitnesses and offenders, with an excursus on
their treatment in police investigations; (b) comprise in partic-
ular which brain areas are involved in face recognition and how
such correlates are influenced by internal and external factors; (c)
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explore the role of face processing, memory distortions, and deceit
in offenders; (d) examine the comparability of data obtained in a
laboratory environment to actual events and (e) conclude by dis-
cussing the relevance of these findings for juridical purposes, while
providing a perspective on the challenges that still lie ahead.
FALSE MEMORIES
Next to incomplete memory encoding and memory loss, the cre-
ation of false memories poses a considerable challenge for lawyers
and experts. The term “false memory” refers to the recollection
of an event that has actually been experienced differently or even
not at all (Kühnel and Markowitsch, 2009). While memory loss
usually works for the benefit of the culprit, false memories can
lead to wrong convictions and imprisonment of innocent people
(Busey and Loftus, 2007). They are a normal everyday phenome-
non, but have serious consequences in court. When talking about
eyewitnesses in the following, we have to keep in mind that offend-
ers are also eyewitnesses to a certain extent and many memory
influencing factors apply for their memories as well. Brainerd and
Reyna (2005) reported a case of a man who after a suggestive
police interview accused himself of murdering is infant son. Later
evidence given by experts who assumed that the injuries were
not likely to be caused in the way the accused had described and
recordings of the police interview led to the assumption that the
confession was coerced. Though false memories appear regularly,
certain conditions can enhance their occurrence. In police inter-
views, caution is indicated, as eyewitnesses can be very prone to
suggestions (Loftus, 2011). This may be promoted by the mental
or physical constitution of the eyewitness (for example high emo-
tional state, stress, or sleep-deprivation) or social demands like the
wish to help the police and to catch the culprit. Zhu et al. (2010)
also reported individual differences in false memory concerning
the exposure to misinformation. They found a negative correlation
with intelligence, perception, memory, and face judgment abilities.
Misinformation can be obtained by conversation with other eye-
witnesses or by suggestive questions during the police interview.
Suggestive questions can include false or at least new informa-
tion for the eyewitness. They can also facilitate the creation of
false memories without providing any new content, for example
by presuming that the eyewitness must have observed something
(Brainerd and Reyna, 2005). However, questioning cannot only
provoke false memories, but it can also induce forgetting (Migue-
les and García-Bajos, 2007; Camp et al., 2012). Retrieval practice
normally enhances recollection of the studied items, but it can
have opposite effects on related but not recapitulated informa-
tion. This phenomenon has been observed with respect to, for
example, the memory of offender’s characteristics. A multitude of
factors affects eyewitnesses’ memory, such as the wording of ques-
tions, post-event information, confidence malleability, attitudes
and expectations, exposure time, presentation format, or alcohol
intoxication (Kassin et al., 2001).
Though guidelines for the treatment of eyewitnesses do exist
(Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 2003), Wright
(2007) gave voice to his concern that jurors might not be aware of
the differences between presentation formats for offender identi-
fication (e.g., sequential and simultaneous lineups) and their reli-
ability. Apparently, not only eyewitnesses and suspects have to be
handled with care for preserving their memories, but also judges,
advocates, and jurors must be sensitized to possible memory
influencing factors.
INFLUENCES ON MEMORY ACCURACY AND QUANTITY
Memory performance can be influenced by many different factors.
Below we highlight some of those memory enhancing or impair-
ing variables, although we cannot assume the possibility of giving
an exhausting overview.
Age is one important factor that affects memory of events.
Infantile eyewitnesses pose a special challenge to investigators,
inasmuch as they are more susceptible to suggestions and research
approaches are limited for ethical reasons. In a group of children
aged 5–12 years old, older children were more prone to connect
gist-based information across several events than younger chil-
dren (Odegard et al., 2009). Clifford et al. (2012), who compared
7- to 8-year-olds with a group of 13- to 14-year-olds, also found the
younger children to be more vulnerable to the detrimental effects
of time delay in an identification task. In a study conducted by
Humphries et al. (2012), adults made more correct identifications
in the sequential lineup video condition than 5- to 6-year-olds
and 9- to 10-year-olds, but not in the simultaneous and in elimina-
tion lineups. During target-absent lineups, adults exhibited higher
correct rejection rates than children, regardless of lineup condi-
tion. At the upper end of the age range, findings are quite mixed.
Elderly persons (aged 57–73) tended to make more false alarms
than younger adults (aged 19–27) in an experiment by García-
Bajos et al. (2012). They also performed poorer in a recall task, but
only regarding actions untypical for the event (i.e., a bank robbery,
a video of which had been shown to the participants). Neverthe-
less, there was no difference in recall between groups concerning
highly typical actions. Notwithstanding lower recall scores, elderly
persons seem to be less prone to misinformation effects under
special circumstances. In an experiment by West and Stone (2013)
younger adults made more mistakes due to misinformation than
older adults when learning occurred incidentally, but not when it
was intended. Maybe less complete information processing in the
older group might have worked in this case to their benefit. Given
these results, it can be concluded, that although differences exist
between older and younger adults’ memory abilities, they may
be more or less pronounced depending on the exact investigated
skills.
The capability of identifying unfamiliar faces varies largely over
individuals, and we still do not completely understand the underly-
ing mechanisms. Megreya and Bindemann (2013) investigated the
relationship between identification abilities and personality and
found higher identification skills for women who scored low on
anxiety and tension and high on emotional stability. The impact of
personality on eyewitness testimony is still unclear, but although
findings are still somehow heterogeneous, our understanding of
other modulating factors is much less limited.
Most studies dealing with the influences of alcohol on eyewit-
ness memory report alcohol intoxication to cause reduced recall
accuracy (van Oorsouw and Merckelbach, 2012) as well as impair-
ment of conscious recollection (Ray and Bates, 2006). However,
familiarity-based recollection seems to be not affected (Bisby et al.,
2010). Regarding the recognition of perpetrators, these findings
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imply that identification ability in lineups or photospreads in
which the culprit is present is apparently not impaired by alco-
hol consumption, although it comes to more false identifications
in culprit-absent trials (Yuille and Tollestrup, 1990; Dysart et al.,
2002). Read et al. (1992) found that alcohol reduced person identi-
fication in a consecutive study, but only when participants’ arousal
was low. In contrast, Schreiber Compo et al. (2012) could not find
a significant difference between the amount of accurate or inac-
curate details (as well as “I don’t know” statements) reported by
sober and intoxicated participants. However, under certain cir-
cumstances, alcohol might even benefit memory. In a study by
Moulton et al. (2005), alcohol administered after learning facili-
tated recall of prose passages read before. Perhaps alcohol preserves
recently acquired memories by suppressing cognitive interference
with new material. The impact of alcohol on eyewitness testimony
may therefore depend on the timing of consumption. Interest-
ingly, numerous studies have been performed since many decades
that revealed state-dependent recall under alcohol (e.g., Goodwin
et al., 1969; Hoffman et al., 1997). Weingartner et al. (1976) for
instance found that encoding under alcohol intoxication should
be followed by retrieval under alcohol intoxication. If individu-
als are sober at retrieval while they had learned the words while
intoxicated, they performed poorer than in the matched condition.
In any case, alcohol intoxication in witnesses during the incident
seems to be widespread. Astonishingly, only few general guide-
lines for interviewing intoxicated eyewitnesses exist (Evans et al.,
2009b), so that sober and intoxicated eyewitness are often treated
quite similarly (Palmer et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the results of an
experiment conducted by Evans and Schreiber Compo (2010) are
somehow more encouraging: even if participants did not consider
the whole range of potential factors and their interactions, they
were quite aware of possible derogating effects of alcohol on eye-
witnesses’ cognitive abilities and these considerations modulated
their verdicts. But for including such considerations, jurors must
be informed about possible intoxications and according to Evans
et al. (2009b), 71% of the investigators do not use an instrument
for determining the breath alcohol content when intoxication is
suspected. This illustrates the need for standardized guidelines.
Results concerning the impact of stress on eyewitness mem-
ory are diverse as well. Stress can enhance memory for central
events, especially in comparison to peripheral events, if stimuli
are encoded under arousal and stress is experienced shortly after
encoding (McGaugh and Roozendaal, 2002; Echterhoff and Wolf,
2012; McGaugh, 2013). Cahill et al. (2003) found a beneficial effect
of post-learning stress on emotionally arousing stimuli but not on
neutral items. Other studies argue for more detrimental effects
of stress. In two studies described by Wolf et al. (2004), corti-
sol administration had more detrimental effects on the retrieval
of neutral autobiographic episodes, while it impaired retrieval of
emotional words from a word list (cf. Kuhlmann et al., 2005; de
Quervain et al., 2007). The way in which stress affects memory
for emotional content, seems to depend on the kind of stim-
uli learned. Kuhlmann and Wolf (2006) observed stress-induced
recall enhancement for emotional pictures and an impairment for
neutral pictures while recognition remained unaffected (cf. Liu
et al., 2008). Stress can also exacerbate the misinformation effect
(Morgan et al., 2013) and stress during encoding can lead to a
more liberal response bias (Qin et al., 2012). Participants com-
pleting a high-intensity physical-assault exercise before encoding
showed impaired performance in recall and recognition. They
were also less able to identify a target in a lineup (Valentine and
Mesout, 2009; Hope et al., 2012). Andreano and Cahill (2006)
found an inverted-U relationship between dose of endogenous
stress hormones and memory in men but not in women. Hence,
stress intensity might also contribute to enhancing and impair-
ing effects of stress. Furthermore, stress also modulates the extent
of involvement of several brain structures (Schwabe and Wolf,
2012). In summary, the effect of stress on memory depends on
many parameters like gender, stress intensity, emotional valence,
time between learning and retrieval, context (Schwabe et al., 2009),
time of stress induction (Smeets et al., 2008; Wolf, 2012), stimuli
material, and its relatedness to the stressor (Smeets et al., 2009).
Several studies have been conducted concerning context-
dependent memory. Congruence between the context of a per-
ceived event and the retrieval situation can enhance memory for
this event (cf. Smith and Vela, 2001 for a review). Context can refer,
e.g., to the physical environment (Godden and Baddeley, 1975) or
to the physiological state like intoxication (Eich, 1980) but also to
the experienced mood during learning phase and retrieval phase
(Fitzgerald et al., 2011).
One phenomenon with impact on our attention and therefore
on our memory is referred to as “weapon focus.” Negative arous-
ing objects in a scene (e.g., weapons) can reduce recognizability of
peripheral information (Easterbrook, 1959; Kensinger and Schac-
ter, 2007; Kensinger et al., 2007; Waring and Kensinger, 2009). In
general, memory for details of negative arousing stimuli seems to
be enhanced compared to neutral objects (Kensinger et al., 2006).
On the other hand, emotionally aversive stimuli can disrupt later
recall of previously retrieved neutral information (Strange et al.,
2003, 2010). Interestingly, Hurlemann et al. (2005) could not only
demonstrate negative items to elicit retrograde amnesia for pre-
ceding neutral words, but also found positive stimuli to induce
hypermnesia for previously recapitulated neutral items. They also
observed emotionally arousing stimuli – negative items as well
as positive items – to provoke anterograde amnesia. Thus, valence
and arousal seem to make different contributions to memory, with
valence determining enhancing or impairing effects on retrograde
memory and arousal affecting anterograde memory (Hurlemann,
2006). But the experience of an aversive event cannot only induce
amnesia, it can also lead to anxiety disorders like post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) (Mineka and Oehlberg, 2008).
The influences discussed above rather concern general mem-
ory abilities and possible influencing factors. Below we now
will address the more specific field of face recognition and the
underlying neuronal processes.
MEMORY AND FACE PROCESSING IN EYEWITNESSES
Because humans are better able to distinguish between faces than
between objects of any other category, this expertise in face pro-
cessing led to a wide discussion about the existence of specialized
brain areas which are solely responsible for face processing (Sato
and Yoshikawa, 2013). A lot of light was shed by the examination
of patients with prosopagnosia, an inability of identifying previ-
ously known persons by watching their faces (Damasio et al., 1990;
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Minnebusch et al., 2009). Typically these patients remain capable
of recognizing relatives and friends from voice, categorizing faces
as faces, and are often even able to interpret facial expressions
(Tranel et al., 1988).
We have to consider that face recognition involves a lot of differ-
ent processes. In the eyewitness context, the aim is to distinguish
between familiar und unfamiliar faces (Have you seen this man
before?), or even better: to ascertain a special identity of a person
(Is this the man who offended you?). But a lot of variables modulate
the way in which faces are analyzed, like the individual components
of the face (Itier et al., 2006), race (Phelps et al., 2000; Behrman
and Davey, 2001; Golby et al., 2001; Johnson and Frederickson,
2005; Turk et al., 2005), sex (Lewin and Herlitz, 2002; Rahman
et al., 2004; Hofmann et al., 2006; Rehnman and Herlitz, 2007;
McBain et al., 2009), expressed mood (Kaufmann and Schwein-
berger, 2004; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007), movement (Roark et al.,
2003; Lander and Davies, 2007), and the eyewitness’ age (Memon
et al., 2003a; Firestone et al., 2007). Likewise, hair does have an
effect on eyewitness accuracy (Wright and Sladden, 2003; Frowd
et al., 2012c), but is often excluded from face recognition studies
which might be wise also in respect of delinquents often wearing
headgears.
Face processing always seems to cause activation in the face
fusiform regions, but encoding and recall of learned faces must uti-
lize more extended networks (Elgar and Campbell, 2001; Steeves
et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2012; Parvizi et al., 2012), like participa-
tion of the anterior temporal cortex including the anterior tip of
the collateral sulcus (Nestor et al., 2011; Nasr and Tootell, 2012).
Rossion et al. (2012) used intact and scrambled versions of object
and face pictures to unravel the neural mechanisms behind face
processing in an fMRI block design experiment. They identified
several clusters: e.g., in the pulvinar, inferior occipital gyrus, poste-
rior superior temporal gyrus, anterior infero-temporal cortex, and
amygdala, all with a pronounced right lateralization. The mid-
dle fusiform gyrus distinguished best between faces and objects
but because of its concomitant differentiation between the pic-
tures of cars and scrambled cars it was also identified as the least
face-selective region of the ones mentioned above.
Even the kind of familiarity we experience while watching a
face, the way in which we became acquainted with someone, does
play a role. The processing of famous faces in comparison to
personally familiar faces involves different brain areas (Sugiura
et al., 2011). Von Der Heide et al. (2013) included 25 fMRI studies
in a meta-analysis dealing with famous faces and familiar faces
stimuli and also conducted an own empirical fMRI experiment
with picture stimuli of faces differing in famousness and personal
relationship. Baseline images consisted of blurred and landmark
pictures. The authors found higher left-lateralized anterior tem-
poral lobe activations for familiar faces, while activation associated
with novel individuals was evoked in the right anterior temporal
lobe. Activation connected to personally familiar faces and famous
faces partially overlapped, but famous faces activation exhibited a
more ventral pattern. The study design is somehow problematic as
experimental tasks differed between famous and familiar faces. For
familiar faces, participants rated which of two presented known
persons they feel closer to, while in the famous faces condition, par-
ticipants had to complete a 0-back task indicating if two images of
the same category (famous vs. non-famous) appeared in succes-
sion. But it can be concluded that any of the mentioned aspects
above, like the individual characteristics of face components and
their relation to each other, evoke slightly different combinations
of neural collaboration. This is one of the reasons why clarifying
the underlying neural mechanisms is so demanding. For a holistic
understanding, face recognition has to be broken down to many
single processes, which probably do not stand for themselves, but
depend on each other.
From a criminological perspective, the most intriguing aspects
are: (i) the distinction between familiar and unfamiliar (Shah et al.,
2001) and (ii) the precise source, i.e., where, when, and under
what circumstances someone has been seen before. The first issue
was addressed by Gobbini and Haxby (2006) who compared the
neural responses to known faces with activation corresponding to
new faces in an event-related fMRI study. Familiarity of known
faces was induced experimentally in order to avoid any biograph-
ical or emotional content. The authors found higher activation
in the precuneus while watching familiar faces. Observing new
faces led to higher responses in the fusiform gyrus and the amyg-
dala. The authors suggested that this might reflect higher encoding
effort (or increased attentional load) and an elevated guarding
function, respectively. In a preceding fMRI study (Gobbini et al.,
2004), similar results have been found with the amygdala show-
ing lower activation during presentation of personal familiar faces
compared to famous familiar faces and faces of strangers. New
faces were associated with higher activation in the fusiform gyrus
in contrast to famous familiar faces. But no difference between
faces of strangers and faces of personally acquainted persons was
detected in this region. Familiarity’s effect on this area does not
seem to be linear. Gobbini and Haxby (2007) also proposed a
new model for face recognition consisting of the three elemental
parts “visual appearance,” “person knowledge” (e.g., information
about traits, intentions, attitudes, biographical facts, and episodic
memories), and the“emotional response.”These components may
involve different brain structures and failure to access one of them
could lead to impaired recognition. The emotional response to
the face of an offender will obviously differ from the reaction to
beloved relatives or friends and consequently alter brain activa-
tion. Unrestricted transferability from those findings to criminal
contexts is indeed questionable. To untangle the underlying neural
mechanisms involved in recognition of a culprit’s face, we have to
investigate more realistic settings which exhibit criminal content.
But before we have a closer look on studies facing this issue, we
must keep in mind that several methods and approaches exist
to confront eyewitnesses with suspects or rather to extract the
wanted facial details from their memories: like lineups (Clark and
Tunnicliff, 2001; Wells and Olson, 2003), showups, photospreads
(Yarmey, 2004), mug shots, or facial-composite production (Wells
and Hasel, 2007). It is rather obvious that these different proce-
dures do not only lead to different results in memory accuracy, but
will also affect the incidental brain activity. Furthermore, there is
evidence that the amygdala is active toward attractiveness of a face,
particularly its eyes (Demos et al., 2008) and that individuals – such
as boys with conduct problems and callous-unemotional traits –
may be unable to detect the emotional expression of a face due to
amygdala hypoactivity (Jones et al., 2009). Adolphs et al. (1998)
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also found three subjects with complete bilateral amydala damage
to judge faces as more trustworthy and approachable than healthy
individuals. These findings are in accord with the results obtained
by Winston et al. (2002) who could also show in an event-related
fMRI study the bilateral amygdala to be involved in ratings of faces
as untrustworthy, as well as the right insula, while activation in the
right superior temporal sulcus was correlated with judgments as
trustworthy.
Lefebvre et al. (2007) measured event-related brain potentials
in culprit present and absent lineup tasks at different levels of
time delay. Participants first watched four videos, all showing a
mock burglary incident. They were also instructed to pretend that
they had observed a real crime, for which they were the only wit-
nesses. Although memory accuracy deteriorated over time, P300
remained a reliable predictor for correct identification. In culprit-
absent lineups, P300 was reduced. It would indeed be desirable to
extract information about the identity of a culprit even when the
eyewitness is unaware of the correct features. Aspiring to make
a contribution to this issue, Iiadaka et al. (2012) induced false
memories in a face recognition fMRI experiment. The authors
used morphed pictures of faces to evoke a false familiarity for
lure faces. During the test phase, participants were confronted
with old, new, and lure targets in a randomized order. Feelings
of familiarity were correlated to activation in the orbital cortices,
as well as to neural response in the left amygdala. Here, activ-
ity was highest for correct responses, lowest for incorrect answers
regarding old and new items. Neural reaction to incorrect answers
concerning lure items (i.e., stating a lure item as old) and therefore
related to false memories fell somewhere in between. A partic-
ipation in false memories could be unveiled in a region in the
anterior cingulate cortex. In this area, activation was correlated
with the difference in reaction times observed for lure items. Very
demanding is the question what happens when we misinterpret
a face as familiar while the accordant person is unknown to us.
Do we only mix up similar characteristics of two faces as it would
be true for the lure items? Moreover, incorrect answers to com-
pletely new faces could be just as illuminating. Unfortunately,
although Iiadaka et al. (2012) recorded participants’ confidence
ratings (indicating how sure they feel about their responses), the
authors could not differentiate between certainty statements due
to a lack of answers expressed with high confidence (cf. Risius
et al., 2013).
We must bear in mind our objective is not only to help eye-
witnesses remember correctly and avoid the creation of false
memories, but that eyewitnesses can also be deceitful for a variety
of reasons (e.g., to protect themselves or others). Bhatt et al. (2009)
conducted an fMRI study in which participants were confronted
with target present and target absent photo lineups. Targets had
been learned previously. The subjects were partly instructed to
lie and to conceal the identity of the learned face and to pretend
that another face is the recognized one. During the truthful tri-
als, it was their task to identify the known face and to pick any if
no face seemed familiar to them. Lying was correlated with acti-
vation in the medial frontal gyrus, red nucleus, inferior frontal
gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (all occurring right-lateralized), and the bilateral
precuneus.
As the entirety of the studies presented above clearly shows, we
are not just dealing with one distinct network for face recogni-
tion but rather with a set of different brain areas that are more or
less involved depending on the precise face processing demands.
We thus have to face the far more difficult task of unraveling a
multitude of interactions. While a complete understanding of face
recognition on a neural level will probably elude us for quite a
while, some neural correlates allow at least for a certain degree of
predictability in a specialized setting.
MEMORY AND FACE PROCESSING IN OFFENDERS
Since we began to discuss the possibility of eyewitnesses operating
as delinquents, we must be aware of the fact that offenders are
eyewitnesses as well and that it is of high juridical interest to learn
about their contingent memory specifics. However, whereas the
mechanisms of face recognition are of particular interest in eyewit-
ness testimony, they are not in the focus of attention in offender’s
memory. Nonetheless, some insight could be gained referring to
altered brain activation during face processing in offenders, for
instance regarding emotional expressions as has been demon-
strated in a couple of studies. In a case-report paradigm, Hoff
et al. (2009) collected fMRI data from a psychopath with criminal
background and a control group performing an n-back task with
drawn facial expressions and scrambled drawings. The researchers
found pronounced differences between groups: facial expressions
involved phylogenetically older regions in the psychopathic partic-
ipant, whereas only neocortical areas were activated in the control
group. In another fMRI study, subjects labeled the sex of male and
female faces with differing emotional expressions in varied inten-
sities (Pardini and Phillips, 2010). Participants were chronically
violent or non-violent men. The former showed reduced brain
activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex referring to faces in
general, regardless of the expressed mood. In contrast, higher acti-
vation emerged in these regions with respect to mild fearful faces.
The group of violent men also exhibited higher activation in the
amygdala for neutral in comparison to happy faces. Very remark-
able is the finding of an elevated activation for mild fearful faces in
the violent group which could not be seen while watching neutral
faces or faces with more pronounced fearful cues. The authors sug-
gest that chronically violent men may interpret ambiguous facial
expressions differently from others.
Criminals often exhibit mental disorders like addiction, amne-
sia, or psychopathy, and those characteristics could be also respon-
sible for alternating results in memory or brain function (Par-
watikar, 1990; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011; Oszoy et al.,
2013). In a word and face encoding fMRI experiment for example,
alcohol-dependent patients did not exhibit the right-lateralized
activation in the parahippocampal region during face encoding
which had been observed in a healthy control group (Yoon et al.,
2009). Concerning the immediate effects of alcohol on mem-
ory encoding, Söderlund et al. (2007) reported alcohol impaired
memorization for object pairs and face-name pairs (but not for
words and phrase-word pairs) that was associated with reduced
bilateral prefrontal activation (cf. also the above-mentioned inves-
tigations on the state-dependency of memory under alcohol
influence). Other differences between groups were found in the
parahippocampal gyrus. In cases of antisocial personality disorder,
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discrepancies in brain function have been observed as well. In an
EEG study by Pfabigan et al. (2012) with happy and angry faces
as feedback stimuli, participants with antisocial personality traits
displayed a smaller event-related P1 amplitude than participants
with low antisocial personality scores.
Although face identification by offenders is of less juridi-
cal importance, comprehension of those distorted processes and
influences on memory might lead to a better understanding of
offender behavior. Usually, the more intriguing question in this
context concerns the details of the crime, which may include the
description of the victim but mostly highlight the act and cir-
cumstances of the perpetration. A deeper understanding of brain
functions dealing with the representation, encoding, and recall of
event memory would make an important contribution. Hasson
et al. (2004) used functional brain imaging to demonstrate paral-
lels in brain activation between subjects watching a movie. They
found intersubject synchronization in multiple cortical regions.
The results lead to the assumption that identical events might
be processed in a similar way in different individuals. However,
is this conferrable to criminal events? Offender and victim (to a
certain extent) experience the same incident, but their particular
role, their thoughts, and emotions will obviously be totally dif-
ferent from each other. While a crime in many cases is mostly
traumatic for victims, possible occurrence of pleasurable feelings
is also discussed in offenders (Evans, 2006). But although research
normally focuses on trauma in victims, offenders can also suffer
from intrusive memories related to their crimes and even develop
a PTSD (Evans et al., 2007b). It is difficult to make a statement
concerning prevalence, and indications vary in a wide range over
studies (Evans, 2006). Pollock (1999) reported PTSD occurring
in 52% of the 80 investigated perpetrators who were accused of
committing homicide. Probability for developing PTSD depended
on the offender’s personality traits and the form of violence cho-
sen. Evans et al. (2007a,b) found in a sample of 105 offenders,
who had been convicted of killing or seriously harming some-
one that 46% suffered from intrusive memories and 6% from
PTSD. The authors assume that factors predicting reexperiencing
symptoms like flashbacks in victims could be generalized to cul-
prits. The probability of developing PTSD is also influenced by
the impulsivity of a crime. Reactive homicide for example refers
to a spontaneous and emotional driven aggression and yields a
high risk of evolving negative feelings which may lead to PTSD.
Instrumental homicide in contrast is goal-directed, planned, and
proactive. There is no actual provocation required and the vic-
tim can be completely meaningless to the culprit (Christianson
et al., 2007). On the other hand, not only unrequested memories
like in PTSD can plague offenders, dissociative amnesia for the
offense can occur as well. In a population of 207 convicts sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, Pyszora et al. (2003) found amnesia
primarily to be connected to preceding alcohol abuse, blackouts,
psychiatric disorders, and crimes of passion. Among the 105 per-
petrators studied by Evans et al. (2009a), 19% stated to have
partial amnesia and 1% complete amnesia for their offense (cf.
Parwatikar, 1990). The type of crime also affects the probability of
developing amnesia. Reactive violent offends lead to memory loss
more often than instrumental violent crimes (Cooper and Yuille,
2007).
Investigators do not only have to face several memory distortion
phenomena while working with delinquents. They also have to cal-
culate the risk of deceitful tendencies like denying or malingering.
For a perpetrator, deceiving about what he or she did or at least
feigning a memory impairment can be appealing in terms of some
legal implications, like criminal responsibility and competency to
stand trial (Porter et al., 2001). A culprit who cannot remember the
details of his or her crime can hardly make an expedient contribu-
tion to his defense. Expert advice is needed in those cases to proof
if the memory impairment is caused by organic disease, disso-
ciative amnesia, a psychotic episode, or feigned amnesia (Bourget
and Whitehurst, 2007), though a differentiation between dissocia-
tive (also called “psychogenic”) amnesia and amnesia with organic
origin is questionable (Barbarotto et al., 1996). Markowitsch and
colleagues (Markowitsch et al., 1997, 2000a; Markowitsch, 1999)
reported deviated brain activity measured by PET and SPECT
in several patients with dissociative amnesia diagnosis. Feigned
amnesia is not only problematic because it has to be detected in
the first place. It can also impair memory performance. After a
mock crime, van Oorsouw and Merckelbach (2004) instructed a
group of participants to feign amnesia in a free recall test. A week
later, participants completed the free recall test again but were
briefed to respond honestly. Their performance was compared to
the results of two control groups: one group made honest efforts
on both tests, the immediate and the delayed, the other group only
attended on the delayed test. The group that had been honest all
the time and took part in both trials outperformed the simula-
tors and the controls that underwent the test for the first time.
The authors suggest that malingering might have similar effects
as a lack of rehearsal. Analogous results have been observed in
other studies (Christianson and Bylin, 1999; van Oorsouw and
Merckelbach, 2006).
This may also be very important in the light of offenders’ often
claimed wish to forget about their crime. Next to a lack of rehearsal,
several other reasons must be considered to possibly evoke amnesia
(Christianson et al., 2007). For example, the differences between
the highly emotional and arousing state during the act of crime and
the calm environment of the criminal investigation could hinder
correct retrospection, whereas recreating the context and the inter-
nal state during the crime could facilitate memorization (cf. the
state-dependency of memory; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012).
Other conceivable explanations are intoxication, head injuries,
brain diseases, or failures in meta-memory, i.e., for example the
own conviction of being amnesic.
Several attempts have been made to detect lying using brain
imaging technology, like in the above-mentioned study by Bhatt
et al. (2009). And in pathological liars, white matter seems to be
reduced in prefrontal regions (Yang et al., 2005). Markowitsch et al.
(2000b) compared brain activation corresponding to real and fic-
titious autobiographical events and found the original events to
evoke a neural response in the right amygdala, the right tem-
porofrontal junction areas, and other cortical regions, while the
invented stories led to activation in the precuneus. The differences
may be caused by the stories’ unequal emotional attraction and
the precuneus’ well-known role in mental imagery.
The question arises, whether neural correlates of delinquent
behavior exist. Some evidence has been found concerning brain
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structure and brain activity alteration in individuals with criminal
background or antisocial personality disorder. Differences can be
observed, e.g., in the frontal lobes, in frontotemporal regions, and
in limbic structures (Bassarath, 2001). But caution is indicated,
since some of these changes can be found in persons not perpetrat-
ing crimes as well, and so in this context, no exclusive relationship
between brain and behavior anomalies has been proofed to date
(Markowitsch and Kalbe, 2007).
These findings illustrate that offenders’ memory abilities might
differ in many ways from eyewitnesses’ capacities for remem-
bering. The differences may be due to the perpetrators specific
involvement in the act of crime, comorbidities like intoxication,
PTSD, amnesia, or antisocial personality disorder or intended for-
getting. A divergence in face processing is accompanied by a change
in brain function and may also modulate emerging memory tracks
for face stimuli even under normal conditions. Finally, the ques-
tionable truthfulness of the investigated persons exacerbates the
researcher’s effort of shedding some light into culprits’ powers of
recollection.
REALITY VS. LABORATORY
Science has already made a wide range of contributions to legal
implications concerning the treatment of eyewitnesses in recent
years, like the cognitive interview (Holliday et al., 2012; Shar-
man and Powell, 2013) or several approaches of evolving facial
composites (Frowd et al., 2012a,b). But in reforming the existing
procedures, we have to weigh costs against benefits (Clark, 2012).
In many cases, a reduction of false identifications is accompanied
by a reduction in correct identifications as well. Further investiga-
tion is needed, and with the advent of neuroimaging techniques,
research also starts to unravel the underlying neural mechanisms
involved in person identification and face recognition. But these
methods rely on laboratory settings and presumably lack ecolog-
ical validity. While examining culprits, reliable data is even more
difficult to obtain, as an offender’s cooperation without any inten-
tion of deceit cannot be taken for granted. Rightly the question
arises whether results obtained under such laboratory conditions
can be transferred to real felonious cases.
In the field of neuroimaging, original data of real-life events
is obviously hard to come by. However, even if such precious
pieces of data could be obtained, their interpretation would be
more than challenging. Lacking the standardized methods used
in experimental settings, performances of different eyewitnesses
or offenders, perhaps even across different cases, would be rarely
comparable. Nevertheless, the question arises whether laboratory
studies can teach us something about the nature of eyewitness
memory and what pitfalls might be waiting in their analysis.
A compromise is attempted in so-called ecologically valid test-
ing situations. One such study was performed by Mohamed et al.
(2006) who tested normal individuals under two opposing con-
ditions. In one the subjects agreed to the statement that he or
she fired a gun, and in the other they disagreed. In this way the
same individual could be tested with functional brain imaging
under both the lie and the truth condition. As expected from the
results of subsequent studies (e.g., Markowitsch, 2008; Spence and
Kaylor-Hughes, 2008; Markowitsch and Merkel, 2011), there was
more activation during the lie than during the truth condition.
Frontal, temporal, cingulate, fusiform, insular, and occipital areas
were activated during the lie condition, while for the truth con-
dition there was more limited frontal and temporal activation,
possibly including the lenticular nucleus.
Ihlebæk et al. (2003) compared eyewitness memory originating
from a video and a live condition. Subjects in the live condition
took part in a staged bank or service station robbery. Robbers
were performed by two police officers. For the video condition
a recording was used which was made by one of the researchers.
Their major finding was the difference between groups concerning
the number of details reported, with participants in the video con-
dition outmatching the other subjects. They reported more details
and were more accurate. Nevertheless, the patterns of mistakes
were quite similar, for example both groups over- or underesti-
mated event duration and age of the robbers. As the authors point
out, the lower rate of memorized details in the “live” group might
be due to the fact that witnesses may have had less opportunity to
watch the robbers closely, since some of them have been forced to
get down to the floor and to cover their faces. This is supported by
the fact that a high proportion of the differences between groups
can be explained by “I don’t know” answers. The authors outline
that laboratory experiments may overestimate eyewitness mem-
ory, but that the kind of errors that are made are quite similar
in both settings. It can be argued that a staged robbery still is an
artificial event, in particular because the participants have been
informed.
Wagstaff et al. (2003) conducted two studies to analyze archival
testimonies of 70 and 48 real crime witnesses, respectively. In all
cases the particular culprit was arrested and convicted. They tried
to discover, how the level of violence, the presence of a weapon,
and the age of witnesses affect memory accuracy regarding the
offender’s age, height, build, hair color, and hairstyle. Violence
(and also partly the type of crime) predicted memory performance
concerning hair color; the higher the level of violence, the more
accurate the victims’ judgments regarding this aspect. Witnesses to
rape also gave more precise statements concerning hair color than
witnesses to robbery. But both factors, violence and type of crime,
were not unrelated, since crimes of rape involved higher rates of
violence in the investigated cases. Closer distance to the culprit, a
longer exposure time (Memon et al., 2003b), or the higher proba-
bility of knowing the offender are conceivable explanations which
might have contributed to these results.
We have performed two experiments in which we tested eye-
witnesses under laboratory conditions. In the first study (Kühnel
et al., 2008), normal participants studied short movies (each of
less than 4 min duration). Thereafter they had to respond with
YES (seen) or NO (not seen) to individual pictures which either
stemmed from the movie or not. Some of these single shots had
a high likeliness of having been in the respective movie and some
not. Overall, participants made almost 45% erroneous responses.
However, brain images obtained with functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) revealed a more clear-cut picture: the
correctly identified pictures led to a medial prefrontal/anterior
cingulate activation while the falsely identified resulted in acti-
vations in the visual association cortex and the precuneus (all
bilaterally) (Figure 1). In a second study (Risius et al., 2013) we
again used a film and asked normal participants later during fMRI
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FIGURE 1 | Brain imaging activations during correct or false
identification of visual stimuli in the study of Kühnel et al. (2008)
(horizontal sections; left: activations during correct answers, right:
activation during false answers).
to judge whether a statement referring to the film was correct or
not. Furthermore, they had to give confidence judgments for each
choice and – if they wished – they could bet that their answer
was correct. If this happened, activations were found in temporal,
frontal, and middle and posterior cingulate areas as well as in the
precuneus. Otherwise cingulate and medial temporal regions were
activated. Withholding an answer (as compared to volunteering it)
resulted in increased bilateral hippocampal activations as well as
in an activation in the left caudate nucleus.
Several factors may influence eyewitness memory and espe-
cially by the use of field studies it is difficult to discover which of
them are crucial and how they might interact with each other. Lab-
oratory experiments can manipulate single factors and give us an
idea of the underlying processes, restricted to the fact that exper-
imental designs differ in many characteristics from real criminal
experiences. But even those authentic events differ in many aspects
such as stress-level, amount of violence, weapon presence, distance
to the offender, and if he or she is familiar to the eyewitness. Many
attempts have to be made to complete this mosaic. Therefore Chae
(2010, p. 259) concluded: “No single study, either naturalistic or
experimental, can cover all the relevant factors present in forensic
situations.” With regards to the benefit of field tests of eyewitness
identification procedures Schacter et al. (2008,p. 5) recommended:
“No single field study can produce a final blueprint for procedural
reform; we will need many.” And so both approaches – field and
laboratory research – bring their advantages into account: ecolog-
ical validity and experimental control. But a lot of effort has to be
made to compensate for their disadvantages and to integrate the
findings into a coherent picture.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The multitude of parameters affecting eyewitness’ and offender’s
memories illustrates the need for standardized methods regard-
ing the treatment of witnesses and suspects. But not only police
officers have to be sensitized for the influences their interview
techniques might have on the reliability of testimonies and how
best recollection results can be obtained. Also judges, advocates,
and jurors must be informed about the differences between proce-
dures, the impact they have on memory quality and other factors
working in favor of memory distortion. It is science’s responsibility
not only to evolve, develop, and test those methods in cooperation
with operators, but to educate judging persons how results have
to be interpreted and how much value should be attached to them
(Markowitsch and Merkel, 2011; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011;
Schacter and Loftus, 2013).
This is also true for the upcoming neuroimaging techniques
like fMRI. The investigation of brain function in criminal con-
texts is a young field of research. The prospect of detecting false
memories in eyewitnesses and deception in offenders is highly
appealing. Although, achievement of these objectives would ren-
der a great service, it is still quite a long way before this technique is
able to clarify ongoing brain processes in a reliable manner. Neu-
roimaging data is hard to interpret; all the more because we lack
ecologically valid studies. Face processing for example is modu-
lated by facial characteristics and how familiar the shown person is
to us, but our feelings for this person will affect our brain activity
as well. It does make a difference if we watch a beloved or a neutral
person’s face or if we look at someone we might fear or be angry
about. Encouraging are the results of Lefebvre et al. (2007) who
found the event-related brain potential P300 to indicate correct
target identification in a lineup task. Nevertheless, it still has to be
explored to what extent these findings can be transferred to other
criminal contexts.
Investigation of perpetrators’ memory is even more demand-
ing, since results are often confounded by different comorbidities,
like intoxication or personality disorders. Those concomitant phe-
nomena can cause alternated face processing even under normal
conditions. If we want to learn about offenders’ brain functions,
we must examine those processes in different settings and untan-
gle the confounding factors, but we also must control for deceitful
tendencies culprits might have.
Accordingly,we have to meet the challenge of taming the techni-
cal demands on the one side and to discriminate the neural activity
associated with a special mental state on the other. We still have to
learn a lot about brain function in the context of criminal events
to know what we are searching for in an eyewitness’ or offender’s
head. Even if we could rely on authentic data, fMRI technique still
has to be improved. Up to now it is not possible to reliably detect
false memory or deception by brain imaging outside the labo-
ratory. Laymen might believe in data obtained by brain scans as
objective proof of ongoing brain function, but it has to be pointed
out that it is a product of many decisions made by the researcher,
like the extent of the statistical power, conformation of individ-
ual brain structure to a standardized anatomical brain model, and
other fine adjustments and corrections (Bumann, 2010). Further-
more, it is dangerous to draw conclusions from group analysis
to single subjects. Group data are achieved by averaging data
across individuals. In the extreme, it is possible that no single sub-
ject exhibits an activation pattern as the average mean suggests.
Another risk consists in making a wrong deduction by “reverse
inference” (Poldrack, 2006), that is to infer the presence of a spe-
cial mental state or function on the finding of a special brain
activation pattern. If such a pattern of activity is found, we cannot
be sure that a special mental state, which also has been observed
to show this pattern, is indeed present, since brain structures nor-
mally fulfill many different tasks. On the other hand, the absence
of a pattern, correlated to a special mental state in group analysis,
does not mean that the state of interest must be absent as well, as
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other brain areas could execute the respective cognitive function.
Nevertheless, the potential of these techniques is enormous, and
there is a lot to learn on the way. Therefore, it is important not
to lose courage, to make the attempt to unravel the underlying
processes, and to obtain data from real cases.
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